

















































Reassessing Husserl’s Account of the 




The recent philosophical debate 
about the nature of time is pecu-
liarly focused on the divide between presentism and 
eternalism. As a matter of fact, after Einstein’s 
General Relativity theory most theoretical physicists 
opted for eternalism, also known as “block-universe 
theory”. This view finds support in Minkowski’s 
famous paper Space and Time (1908). Even if theoreti-
cal physicists commonly accept nowadays the con-
cept of spacetime as a mathematical tool, the 
situation is much more complex for what concerns the 
consensus about its very nature. For instance, for 
Rovelli’s Quantum Gravity (QG) theory our perception 
of space and time as continua reveals itself as an illu-
sion, that is, a blurry sight of elementary processes. 
My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that a) the 
opposition between eternalism/spacetime theory and 
QG theory is rooted in their underestimation of sub-
jective experience; b) such a divide could be fruitfully 
overcome by transcendental phenomenology, based 
on the idea that the very experience of time is intui-
tively given as a continuum; c) the formalization of 
spacetime is possible only under this basic subjective 
experience.
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CONTINUUM PHENOMENOLOGY
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recently, his works are mainly focu-
sed on the possibility of a pheno-
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The recent philosophical debate about the nature of time is peculiarly focused on the 
divide between presentism and eternalism. Although there exist many variations of 
these theories, it could be basically argued that, according to presentism only the 
present is real, whereas for eternalism there are such things as merely past and future 
entities (Sider 1999, 325-326). As a matter of fact, after Einstein’s General Relativity 
theory most theoretical physicists opted for eternalism, also known as “block-uni-
verse theory”. This view finds support in Minkowski’s famous paper Space and Time 
(1908), where he provided empirical evidence of the reality of spacetime, consistently 
with Einstein’s theory of special and general relativity. As is well known, Minkowski 
opens his paper as follows: «The views on space and time which I wish to lay before 
you have sprung from the soil of experimental physics. Therein lies their strength. 
Their tendency is radical. Henceforth space by itself, and time by itself, are doomed to 
fade away into mere shadows, and only a kind of union of the two will preserve an 
independent reality» (Petkov 2010, xv). Against Einstein, who initially disagreed with 
the concept of spacetime (but accepted it in 1915), Minkowski claimed that the idea 
of manifolds is essential for general relativity. Indeed, «we would then have in the 
world no longer the space, but an infinite number of spaces, analogously as there are 
in three-dimensional space an infinite number of planes. Three-dimensional geome-
try becomes a chapter in four-dimensional physics» (Petkov 2010, xxi). This means 
that, according to Minkowski, inertial observers in relative motion may occupy dif-
ferent spaces, as entailed by special relativity, only in a real four-dimensional world. 
Conversely, in his eyes, special relativity does not work in a three-dimensional world, 
simply because this latter would imply one absolute space for all inertial observers. As 
a result, Minkowski’s idea of the four-dimensional spacetime not only excludes any 
variety of time-flow, but directly leads to a radical eternalism.
Nevertheless, even if theoretical physicists commonly accept nowadays 
the concept of spacetime as a mathematical tool, the situation is much more com-
plex for what concerns the consensus about its very 
nature. 1 Indeed, as emphasized by Petkov, the present 
situation is characterized by a «proliferation of views 
[…] which reject the reality of spacetime either explic-
itly or implicitly by defending concepts (e.g. becoming 
and flow of time) which are incompatible with the spa-
cetime view of the world» (2019, 1). Among them, it is 
worth considering Rovelli’s claim that both presentism 
and eternalism are “naïve options” (2019, 1325-1335) 
to be overcome in favor of a third way, namely a “local” account of time. In synthe-
sis, Rovelli maintains that, following general relativity and QG (quantistic gravitation), 
time depends on the gravitational field: in other words, once assumed the quantum 
framework of the gravitational field, the quantum events are no longer ordered by 
a unique time. Rather than entailing that there is no change or becoming in the uni-
verse, QG demonstrates that the elementary processes cannot be ordered in a com-
mon succession of instants. Accordingly, time (as a succession of instants) does not 
exist; rather, time locally emerges from the relations among quantum events. There 
is neither a space that contains the world nor a time along which the events happen. 
Instead, there are elementary processes in which quanta of space and matter contin-
uously interact. As a result, for Rovelli our perception of space and time as continua 
reveals itself as an illusion, that is, a blurry sight of elementary processes (2019, 1326).
1 Actually, this debate dates back 
to 1908, when Sommerfeld remarks 
in his notes on Minkowski’s arti-
cle: «What will be the epis-
temological attitude towards 
Minkowski’s conception of the 
time-space problem is another 
question, but, as it seems to 
me, a question which does not 
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Following Petkov’s criticism, Rovelli’s argument comes at a high price. First, 
rejecting both presentism and eternalism keeps unaddressed the question of the di-
mensionality of the world (at a macroscopic scale). Indeed, if presentist account of 
the world is three-dimensional and evolving in time and eternalism (also called “block 
universe”) accounts for a four-dimensional world with time as fourth dimension, 
claiming (as Rovelli does) «neither presentism nor eternalism» should entail that the 
world is neither three-dimensional nor four-dimensional. This means that, in Rovelli’s 
eyes, dimensionality is not a fundamental feature of the world, as commonly accept-
ed in physics. Secondly, Petkov assesses Rovelli’s account of eternalism as a com-
plete misrepresentation. Indeed, rather than claiming «that past and future events 
are “real now” as present events» (2019, 1329), the spacetime theory is based on the 
thesis that no event is to be privileged as “now”, insofar as in spacetime the notion 
of «real now» is meaningless. In other words, Minkowski introduced a static view of 
time for which spacetime is an unchanging, once-and-for-all picture of the world en-
compassing past, present, and future.
Accordingly, from the eternalist perspective, there is no privilege of the 
“now” and, thus, it is totally illegitimate to talk about past and future events simply 
because they are equally real. It is worth emphasizing that, what is really at stake in 
Rovelli’s attempt to overcome eternalism and Petkov’s defense of Minkowski’s space-
time is a precise description of what time really is, namely an ontology of time. In oth-
er terms, both spacetime and QG theory elude any inspection of how the experience 
of time (as becoming and flow) interacts with the physical (real) features of time. If, 
on the one hand, Minkowski admits that the reality of spacetime is a counterintuitive 
picture of the world, albeit supported by a number of experimental evidences, on the 
other hand, Rovelli argues that, all things considered, time’s continuity is a persisting 
illusion. In other terms, they both underestimate the fact that time is always expe-
rienced as a continuum. Indeed, as stressed above, the conflict between spacetime 
theory and our common experience of time extensively characterizes the history of 
both contemporary theoretical physics and philosophy of time.
With this regard, such a conflict is probably at the root of the very diffused 
interpretation of spacetime uniquely as a mathematical tool. However, some emi-
nent physicists felt the need to reconcile spacetime with the subjective experience of 
time. Among others, H. Weyl emphasized that «the objective world merely exists, it 
does not happen; as a whole it has no history. Only before the eye of the conscious-
ness climbing up in the world line of my body, a section of this world “comes to life” 
and moves past it as a spatial image engaged in temporal transformation» (Weyl 
2009, 135). In this short passage, there clearly emerges how, according to Weyl, the 
reality of spacetime and the subjective experience of the time’s flow are to be under-
stood on two different levels. Indeed, if from an ontological point of view the world 
does not happen, in the subject’s eyes reality ceaselessly transforms itself throughout 
an infinite process. Thus, Weyl seems to suggest that the problem of time cannot be 
merely addressed from the ontological standpoint, but also requires an in-depth in-
spection of the subject’s experience of temporal becoming. In other words, both the-
oretical physicists and philosophers of time should deal not only with the description 
of the ontological features of spacetime, but also with the transcendental inspection 
of the experience of the continuum as an absolute given for any subject.
Under these premises, my aim in this paper is to demonstrate that a) the 
opposition between eternalism/spacetime theory and QG theory is rooted in their 
underestimation of subjective experience; b) such a divide could be fruitfully over-
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of time is intuitively given as a continuum; c) the formalization of spacetime is possi-
ble only under this basic subjective experience.
II. Ontology and Epistemology of Time
As is well known, Weyl’s early account of time-continuum (developed in his major 
works The Continuum, 1987, and Space Time Matter 1922, both published in 1918) is 
deeply influenced both by neokantianism 2 and Husserl’s 
transcendental phenomenology. 3 Such an influence is 
to be essentially recognized in Weyl’s claim that coordi-
nate system is «the unavoidable residuum of the ego’s 
annihilation» (1987, § 5.3.4), a clear reprise of Husserl’s 
account of transcendental ego as the residuum of phe-
nomenological reduction in Ideen I (1976, § 49). Nevertheless, although Weyl always 
refers to Ideen I, his account of the continuum is deeply indebted to Husserl’s lectures 
on time-consciousness and the Dingvorlesungen (1997) on the constitution of space, 
some of which he probably attended when Husserl substituted for Hilbert (who was 
Weyl’s teacher of mathematics at that time) during the years 1905-’08. In Weyl’s 
view, our intuition about the continuum originates from common or stable elements, 
namely invariants emerging from a plurality of acts of experience: for instance, the 
perception of time, of movement, of a line extended, and so forth. For what concerns 
time, Weyl considers Husserl’s (and Bergson’s) phenomenal time as a conscious expe-
rience coexisting with memory of the instant just gone. Consistently with Husserl’s 
perspective, Weyl describes the intuition of time as a flow of ongoing transforma-
tions. This means that time is a duration without points: time consists in intercon-
nected parts that are superimposed on each other. With this respect, Weyl’s phenom-
enological heritage is patent:
The view of a flow consisting of points and, therefore, dissolving into points 
turns out to be false. Precisely what eludes us is the nature of the continuity, the 
flowing from point to point; in other words, the secret of how the continually endur-
ing present can continually slip away into the receding past. (1987, 91-92). In other 
terms, Weyl shares with Husserl a radical opposition between, on the one hand, time 
and space as pre-phenomenal experiences and, on the other hand, time and space as 
construed mathematical entities. This means that, whereas the construed entities 
resulting from mathematical formalization are made out of ultimate elements (the 
points), the pre-phenomenal life-experiences ‒ time in particular ‒ cannot be further 
reduced. More closely, Weyl accepts Cantor and Dedekind’s axiom about the one-to-
one correspondence between the real line and the pre-phenomenal space, but judges 
unsatisfactory the extension of such a correspondence to time. Also considering spa-
tial movement, the situation is not significantly different. Indeed, «in movement, the 
continuum of points on a trajectory recovers in a continuous monotone fashion the 
continuum of instants» (Weyl 1987, § 8). But following Weyl’s argument, this is just 
superposition: the temporal continuum does not have points, the instants are merely 
transitions, the present is only possible because of the simultaneous perception of the 
past and of the future. Accordingly, Weyl maintains:
I think that everything we are demanding here is obvious nonsense: to these questions, the in-
tuition of time provides no answer - just as a man makes no reply to questions which clearly 
are addressed to him by mistake and, therefore, when addressed to him, are unintelligible. So 
the theoretical clarification of the essence of time’s continuous flow is not forthcoming. The 
2 See Bernard & Lobo (2019).
3 For more biograph-
ical and theoretical 
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category of the natural numbers can supply the foundation of a mathematical discipline. But 
perhaps the continuum cannot [...]. (1987, 90).
From this there follows that 1) an individual point in time is non-independent, i.e., 
is pure nothingness when taken by itself, and exists only as a “point of transition” 
(which, of course, can in no way be understood mathematically); 2) it is due to the es-
sence of time (and not to contingent imperfections in our medium) that a fixed time-
point cannot be exhibited in any way, that always only an approximate, never an ex-
act determination is possible (Weyl, 1987, 92). Points do not belong to our intuition of 
the continuum, neither temporal nor spatial. 4
As a result, «the point without dimensions is 
a derived conceptual construction, a necessary conse-
quence of a line as a one-dimensional law. It is a poste-
rior reconstruction […] which puts together the points 
to reconstruct the line» (Longo 1999, 404). In the light of this inspection, it could be 
argued that Weyl’s phenomenological inspiration leads him to account for the tran-
scendental features of time experience as fundamental issues for any theory of time. 
Accordingly, although the evidence-based concept of spacetime provides with a use-
ful mathematical tool for sketching an ontology of time, it cannot explain the subjec-
tive experience of time at all. Thus, from Weyl’s perspective a complete theory of time 
is supposed to think together the ontology of time and the epistemology of time ex-
perience. In other words, there is no ontology of spacetime beyond an epistemologi-
cal enquiry on time experience.
Nevertheless, Weyl’s phenomenological posture is not so radical as it seems 
at first glance. Indeed, his thought leads to a precise distinction between objective 
spacetime and subjective time experience, rather than an in-depth assessment of 
their actual interaction. As suggested by R. A. Feist (2004, 138), Weyl’s declaration of 
phenomenological membership should not prevent from considering two points of 
substantial divergence. a) Firstly, Weyl’s claim in The Continuum that the sequence of 
natural number is given in an immediate intuition of iteration is clearly in contradic-
tion with Husserl’s view that there cannot be any direct access to formal categories 
(included the sequence of natural numbers), uniquely graspable by categorial acts. b) 
The second point of divergence concerns Weyl’s choice for predicativism. Following 
Weyl’s argumentation in chapter 6 of The Continuum (probably influenced by 
Poincaré and Russell), the constitution of all higher level objectivities depends on the 
immediate intuition of natural numbers. Thus, whereas the latter exist independent-
ly, all other objectivities are constituted in conformity to logical constraints, that is, 
in Weyl’s view, predicative constructions based upon the domain of natural numbers. 
By contrast, in Husserl’s thought such logical restrictions are totally excluded, insofar 
as he was firmly convinced that mathematics is a variety of knowledge of reality and, 
at the same time, a formal theory of possible regions of being. In other terms, Husserl 
was not committed to any kind of restriction of mathematics with the purpose of fit-
ting it into strictly intuitive (or predicative) limits. Rather, he was strongly involved 
in a research of formal systems, as testified by the Mannigfaltigkeitslehre developed 
through the Logical Investigation as a part of his formal ontology. This means that 
Husserl’s phenomenology does not exclude any formal (non-intuitive) mathematics, 
as well as formal and axiomatic theories of analysis capable of providing a ground for 
regional ontologies.
These two arguments lead Weyl to the thesis that a phenomenological 
foundation of the mathematical continuum based upon the analogy between the 
4 A precise proof of the fact that a 
curve is a law, not a set of points, 
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immediate intuition of time and the intuition of the natural numbers succession 
is in principle excluded. Once demonstrated that the intuitive and the mathemat-
ical continuum do not coincide, Weyl suggests that its mathematical construction 
must necessarily overcome the level of phenomeno-
logical description. 5 This is the basic reason why Weyl 
progressively shift from phenomenology to predicativ-
ism. With this regard, in a lecture delivered in Princeton 
in 1927, with the title Time Relations in the Cosmos, 
Proper Time, Lived Time, and Metaphysical Time, Weyl 
concludes:
The immediately experienced is subjective and absolute. On the other hand, the objective 
world is necessarily relative and may be represented by something definite, numbers or other 
symbols, only after a coordinate system has been arbitrarily imposed on the world. This pair 
of opposites, subjective-absolute and objective-relative, seems to me one of the most funda-
mental epistemological insights one can gather from science. (Weyl 2009, 31)
III. Time, Reality, and the Transcendental
With and beyond Weyl, is it possible to conceive of spacetime and time experience 
together? More precisely, once grasped the double nature of time, how to sketch a 
description of the bond of ontology and epistemology of time? In other words, how 
to take into account both the physical evidence of spacetime and the experience 
of the flowing time as two absolute evidences? My core argument is that this at-
tempt should be made through an in-depth reassessment of Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology.
Within the limit of this work, I cannot provide a complete discussion of the 
huge quantity of passages ‒ from the published texts and manuscripts ‒ where Husserl 
deals with the issue of the continuum. I will limit to the most insightful. Although the 
continuum, namely the phenomenological condition of both the flux of the lived-ex-
periences and the flowing of the intuitive data, is a real leitmotiv of the phenomeno-
logical method as a whole, it plays a peculiar role in the early Husserl, notably in his 
lectures of 1891 on Philosophy of Arithmetic (2003), those of 1905–1908 On the 
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1991), and those of 1907 on 
Things and Space (1997). As emphasized by Tieszen (1996, 304), «Husserl thinks that 
arithmetical knowledge is originally built up in founding acts from basic, everyday in-
tuitions in a way that reflects our a priori cognitive in-
volvement». 6 Within this framework, it is worth noting 
how Husserl takes into serious consideration both the 
intuitive and formal structure of the continuum since 
his first great work. For instance, let us consider the following passage from the sec-
tion about the Origin of the Concept of Manifold in Philosophy of Arihmetics:
If we consider, for example, the cohesion of the points on a line, of the moments of a span 
of time, of the color nuances of a continuous color spectrum, of the tonal qualities in a “tone 
progression”, and so on, then we acquire the concept of combination-by-continuity, and, from 
this concept, the concept of the continuum. This latter concept is not contained as a particu-
lar, distinguishable, partial content in the image of every concretely given continuum. What 
we note in the concrete case is, on the one hand, the points or extended parts, and, on the 
5 As stated by Da Silva (1997, 
289): «Despite its debt to cer-
tain phenomenological ideas, the 
system of The Continuum can-
not be seen as a prototype of 
how the whole of mathematics 
should be developed from the phe-
nomenological perspective».
6 See also Centrone 
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other hand, the peculiar combinations involved. These latter, then, are what is always iden-
tically present whenever we speak of continua, however different may be the absolute con-
tents which they connect (places, times, colors, tones, etc.). Then in reflection upon this char-
acteristic sort of combination of contents there arises the concept of continuum, as that of 
a whole the parts of which are united precisely in the manner 
of continuous combination. (2003, 20) 7
It is worth putting this passage in connection with 
Husserl’s discourse on mathematical entities in § 60 
of the Sixth Logical Investigation (2001c), where he 
distinguishes between sensuous abstraction and pure 
categorial abstraction. Whereas sensuous abstraction 
gives sensuous concept (for instance, “house, red”) and 
mixed concepts, categorical abstraction gives cate-
gorical concepts (for instance, “relation, set, number”), 
called by Husserl “formal-ontological categories”. If 
sensuous and mixed concepts are based upon sensu-
ous intuitions, categorical concepts depend on categorical intuitions. Concerning the 
categorical intuition of a set, categorical abstraction refers to the collection’s form, 
without any consideration of all material aspects of the set’s members. Accordingly, 
provided that logico-mathematical intuition is a categorical intuition purified by cat-
egorical abstraction, pure logic and mathematics include no sensuous concepts. Once 
intuitively grasped a mathematical concept, one can grasp other mathematical ob-
jects in new categorial acts of higher level. Thus, mathematics results being based 
upon pure categorial abstraction, which excludes all the material contained in the 
categorial intuition.
From this standpoint, there emerges how the concept of the continuum 
originates in intuition of concrete data: more precisely, the intuition of continuity is 
the phenomenological condition for any mathematical formalization of the continu-
um. This does not entail that Husserl is not committed to the problem of a rigorous 
formalization of the continuum. With this respect, it must be noted a strong influence 
of Hilbert’s view, following which «one begins by assuming the existence of all ele-
ments (that is one assumes at the beginning three different systems of things: points, 
lines and planes) and one puts these elements into certain relations to one-another by 
means of certain axioms, in particular the axioms of connection, order, congruence 
and continuity» (Hilbert 1900, 181). Nevertheless, Husserl is fully aware of the limits 
of any attempt of formalization of the continuity (the same limits Weyl will empha-
size concerning Cantor-Dedekind’s axiom):
We are able to bring each single group element to representation in its own right in temporal 
succession, even though not in one allinclusive act. But all of this is impossible in the cases to 
which we now turn. We speak of totalities, groups, and multiplicities also where the concept 
of their authentic formation, or of their symbolization through sequential exhaustion of the 
individuals involved, already contains a logical impossibility. We speak of infinite groups. The 
extensions of most general concepts are infinite. The group of the numbers in the symboli-
cally expanded number series is infinite, as is the group of points in a line, and, in general, that 
at the limits of a continuum. The thought that some conceivable expansion of our knowl-
edge capacity could enable us to have the actual representation ‒ or even the mere sequential 
exhaustion ‒ of such groups is unimaginable. Here even our power of idealization has a limit. 
(Husserl 2003, 231)
7 A very similar passage is to 
be found in the Third Logical 
Investigation: «Two contempora-
neous sensuous concreta neces-
sarily form an ‘indifferentiated 
whole’ if all the immediately con-
stitutive ‘moments’ of the one pass 
unbrokenly over into corresponding 
constitutive ‘moments’ of the other. 
The case of exact likeness of any 
such corresponding moments shall 
count as a legitimate limiting case 
of continuity, i.e. as a continuous 
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One could spot the same tension between intuition and formalization of the continu-
um also in Husserl’s lectures of 1907 on Thing and Space as well as in his courses on 
time-consciousness of 1905–19085. In both cases, I cannot provide even a syntheti-
cal overview of the enormous critical literature on these texts: thus I will only recall 
some quotations in order to show how the question of the continuum is at the very 
core of the general problem of the temporal and spatial perception. At the beginning 
of § 19 of Thing and Space, Husserl argues:
Here I have in mind the wonderful phenomenological forms of appearance which have the 
character of extensions of appearance: in them is constituted the spatial and temporal ex-
panse that belongs to the essence of thingly objects; in them therefore lies the source of all 
spatial-temporal predicates. (1997, 51)
For what concerns the spatial continuity, Husserl distinguishes two main mean-
ings: 1) The continuity that belongs to spatial extension as such and that comes to 
consciousness as an immanent moment when we allow unchange to pass over into 
change, for example in the continuous migration of a qualitative discontinuity over 
an expanse filled up unitarily in such and such a way. 2) The continuity of the filling 
determinations themselves, for example the flowing over from quality to quality, per-
haps in the transition from red through purple to violet. But what is particularly rel-
evant for us is that, in Husserl words, «continuity is extension, and qualitative con-
tinuity qualitative extension. That essentially implies fragmentability and the ideal 
possibility of an abstract differentiation into phases. […]» (Husserl 1997, 59). This 
idea of the priority of intuitive continuum upon its mathematical construction is ex-
plicitly attested by the following passage:
Although in fact every body can be resolved into an infinite manifold of plane sections and 
can be considered a continuum of plane sections, yet the geometry of plane figures, which 
encompasses all these sectional figures, is still not the geometry of the spatial body. In pro-
ceeding beyond the plane, what is at issue is precisely the laws according to which the planes 
and the formations lying on them are continually modified. (1997, 173)
Much more complex appears to be the issue of temporal continuum precisely be-
cause of its irreversibility:
If time thus appears as an eternal stream which precipitates everything temporal into the 
abyss of the past, yet, on the other hand, time has validity as an eternal and fixed form, since 
every being maintains its position in time. Even a god cannot alter the temporal positions of 
events in the past. Here reside immense difficulties, which up to now have defied the acumen 
of the greatest. We will still devote efforts of our own to these difficulties. (1997, 55)
In order to make sense of these great difficulties, one has to address the question of 
the continuum within the framework of Husserl’s lectures on time-consciousness 
from 1905–1908. Although the transcendental experience of time reveals some rel-
evant differences with respect to the perception of space, it must be admitted that, 
in both the lectures on time-consciousness and spatial perception, there emerges the 
idea of a basic impossibility of reducing the intuitive 
continuum phases into a set of points. 8 From this per-
spective, in my interpretive hypothesis, Husserl’s deci-
sion of keeping the notion of the “original impression”, 9 
8 Indeed, Husserl argues that 
«What we call original conscious-
ness, impression, or even per-
ception, is an act that is shaded 
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although not conceivable as a punctual source of the 
temporal continuum, strictly depends on his attempt to 
clarify the conditions of the mathematical formaliza-
tion of time. With this regard, Husserl argues:
It is inherent in the essence of every linear continuum that, 
starting from any point whatsoever, we can think of every 
other point as continuously produced from it; and every con-
tinuous production is a production by means of continuous it-
eration. […] The primal impression is the absolute beginning of 
this production, the primal source, that from which everything 
else is continuously produced. But it itself is not produced: it 
does not arise as something produced but through genesis spontanea; it is primal generation, 
it does not spring from anything. It is primal creation. (1991, 106)
Accordingly, the problem of the “original impression” contains and includes the am-
bivalence of the intuitive (pre-phenomenal) continuum and the mathematical con-
tinuum as a logical construction. As is well known, Husserl founds these different ex-
periences of the continuum on two varieties of intentionality (but we know from a 
number of manuscripts that he was not really satisfied by this solution). Expressed in 
terms of the double continuum of “transverse” and “lengthwise” segments, the dis-
tinction between constituted transcendent object and constituting time-conscious-
ness designates the transverse intentionality (phase-continuum), whereas the dis-
tinction between constituted time-consciousness (immanent unity of act and its 
content) and constituting absolute time-consciousness designates the “lengthwise” 
intentionality (stretch-continuum). Nevertheless, in a manuscript from 1908 or 1909, 
Husserl becomes definitively aware of the impossibility of conceiving of the phenom-
enological continuum of time as something objective:
Is it inherently absurd to regard the flow of time as an objective movement? Certainly! On the 
other hand, memory is surely something that itself has its now, and the same now as a tone, 
for example. No. There lurks the fundamental mistake. The flow of the modes of conscious-
ness is not a process; the consciousness of the now is not itself now. […] Memory is an ex-
pression that always and only refers to a constituted temporal object. Retention, on the other 
hand, is an expression used to designate the intentional relation (a fundamentally different 
relation) of phase of consciousness to phase of consciousness and in this case the phases of 
consciousness and continuities of consciousness must not be regarded as temporal objects 
themselves. These are extremely important matters, perhaps the most important in the whole 
of phenomenology. (1991, 345–346)
Husserl approaches anew these «extremely important matters» in the Bernauer 
Manuskripte, where the problem of the originary impression develops into the issue 
of individuation as a temporal process. From a genetic point of view, it is precisely in 
this process that the ego originates in its immanence. This means that individuation 
concerns not only the objects, but also the ego as such. In other words, the immanent 
“living-present” is the most originary type of individuation, composed of a multiplici-
ty of sensible given unified in a continuous sequence. After a decisive discussion with 
R. Ingarden about the problem of the relation between the unity of sensible data and 
the flow of consciousness, Husserl recalls into question the scheme apprehension/
content of apprehension introduced in his Logical Investigations, as testified by the 
perception implies a whole contin-
uum of such shadings. But repro-
duction, phantasy-conscious-
ness, also requires precisely the 
same shadings, only reproduc-
tively modified. It belongs to the 
essence of both of these experi-
ences that they must be extended 
in such a way that a punctual phase 
can never exist by itself » (1991, 49).
9 As is known, the most serious 
difficulty entailed by the concept 
of the original impression is the 
infinite regression from what is 
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manuscripts n. 6 and 9. In these texts Husserl argues that the flux of absolute con-
sciousness constitutes the Erlebnisse as temporal objects within immanent tempo-
rality. This implies that the constitution of the temporal objects is inseparable from 
the constitution of a temporal consciousness. In other words, the flux of absolute 
consciousness implies an essential correlation between immanent perception and 
perceived object. Accordingly, the immanent temporality, namely the noetic side of 
intentionality, derives from the temporal constitution of the flux of consciousness as 
a continuous and consistent flux. From this viewpoint, both objective and immanent 
temporality are based on the “originary process” (Urprozess) of individuation. Indeed, 
Husserl states in the text n. 9:
I mean that it is only by virtue of the coincidence (Deckung) which crosses retention and pro-
tention and continues from an originary presentation to a new one as a coincidence of this 
persisting sound (where the last originary presentation falls into retention), that we grasp the 
sound as a temporal object. If we abstractively isolate an originary presentation and its flow 
in the temporal flux, we obtain in each point a new nuclear given (Kerndatum) taken abstrac-
tively, not a temporal objective given (zeitgegenstandliches). In other terms, we will obtain 
no representation (Darstellung) of something objective within the nuclear given. Accordingly, 
the persisting perception of a sound is not to be understood merely as the objective series 
of the originary presentations. This series is constituted […], as well as the series of the orig-
inary flux; nevertheless its objectivation has a different sense 
[…]. (2001a, 171) 10
In the light of this passage, it is clear that in these man-
uscripts Husserl is no longer committed to the idea of an originary presentation nes-
tled in a double horizon of retentional and protentional phenomena. Thus, he chang-
es his perspective and emphasizes the role played by both the protensions of the flux 
of retentional modifications and the influence of retentions in the determination of 
protentional contents. It follows that the originary process (Urprozess or Urstrom) 
reveals itself not as a mechanism of constant modification of the present in the just 
passed; rather, the temporal flux is deeply intertwined with passive syntheses, an-
ticipations and more or less intense degrees of fulfillment (Erfullung) and empty-
ing (Entfullung). With this respect, Husserl maintains: «Differently from the previ-
ous texts, what is at stake here is no longer the mere […] retentional consciousness of 
the originary flux, but rather a self-consciousness of the originary flux originally an-
chored in the fluent present» (Husserl 2001, XIII). As a consequence, in the Bernauer 
Manuskripte Husserl testifies his awareness of the danger of infinite regression and 
describes the present itself as fluent continuity: «A fluent consciousness structured 
in this way is necessarily a consciousness of itself as fluent» (Husserl 2001a, 48).
Still, the problem is not completely solved as long as the Urprozess is un-
derstood as an independent level of intentional consciousness, responsible for both 
the constitution of the temporal (immanent) objects and the acts of apprehension. 
What remains definitely open is the question of the flux’s nature: provided that the 
flux is placed at a transcendental level, why does it manifest itself a posteriori, as a 
condition of possibility of the constituted time? If the originary process needs to be 
grasped by the ego, without whom the function of constitution would not be possi-
ble, its independence is seriously compromised. This means that, although the nuclear 
model seems to be more fruitful than the model of apprehension (always subject to 
the danger of infinite regression), Husserl does not fully succeed in dealing with the 
difference between act-consciousness and consciousness of originary consciousness. 
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Some scholars 11 conceive of the originary flux as the 
unique non-constituted element in Husserl’s phenom-
enology. According to this view, the originary flux, un-
derstood as longitudinal intentionality, should be the origin of all temporal constitu-
tions. Nevertheless, Husserl emphasizes how longitudinal intentionality is at the same 
time transversal intentionality, which is always in connection with the time of imma-
nent objects. It follows that, in front of the problem of time, the notions of origin, pro-
cess and constitution fall into a kind of short circuit. In order to summarize, what is 
at stake in Husserl’s scrutiny of time-consciousness is the possibility of new originary 
presentations within the continuum of intentional givenness. More precisely, Husserl 
struggles to find an equilibrium between the continuous process of temporalization 
and the emergence of punctual new instants, that is, between the intuitive experi-
ence of continuity and the attempt to formalize it. Each protentional instant is never 
fully anticipated by the previous one: this means that the grasping of temporal flux 
does not consume the surprise of our consciousness in front of the presentation of 
each new instant. It is for this reason that Husserl describes consciousness as what 
emerges from the awakening of time itself (Husserl, 1966, 178).
IV. Conclusions
As already pointed out, the relevance of the phenomenological discourse about the 
time continuum has been largely neglected by mathematicians, theoretical physicists, 
and philosophers of time. Regardless of their reciprocal differences, all of them devel-
oped a number of ontologies of time (i.e. spacetime theory, QG, presentism, eternalism, 
etc.) without taking seriously into account the issue of the subjective-transcenden-
tal time experience, often dismissed as an illusion. Especially after the demonstration 
of the independence of the continuum hypothesis from the set theory’s axioms, this 
issue is nowadays rather controversial. Its history 12 has 
determined a global reconsideration of the notion of 
solution in set theory (and mathematics), because of its 
strong dependence on the issues of consistency and in-
determinacy. With this regard, the continuum hypothe-
sis involves a manifold of philosophical questions dealing with the question “what is a 
solution?” Has the continuum problem been resolved? If so, which solution has been 
found? Otherwise, which is its current status? Under Gödel’s theorem of incomplete-
ness, is it unavoidable a pluralistic view about the continuum?
Gödel himself took part in this debate with an article (1947) in which he 
claimed that, once assumed the correctness of the set theory axioms, there follows 
that concepts and theorems describe a particular reality for which Cantor’s conjec-
ture is either true or false. Thus, the axioms’ indeterminacy implies that they do not 
contain a complete description of that reality (Gödel 1947). Gödel’s perspective can 
be included in the platonic approach to mathematics, namely the view for which 
mathematics has to deal with a realm of objects and concepts independent of our 
mind. From this perspective, the continuum hypothesis has a given value of truth, in-
dependently of our ability to discover it. By contrast, Cohen (1963) maintains that the 
demonstration of the continuum hypothesis’ independence of Zermelo-Fraenkel’s 
axioms (plus the axiom of choice) 13 is completely sat-
isfying: rather than requiring the understanding of any 
mathematical reality (as argued by Gödel), the solution 
of the continuum problem depends on the results we 
11 See for instance 
Sokolowski (1964).
12 For a precise overview of this 
discussion, see Linnebo (2017), 
especially chapters 4, 8, and 12.
13 There exist two classic formu-
lations of the continuum hypothe-
sis: each infinite subset of the con-
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can reach within a certain axiomatic system. His forma-
listic solution is widely diffused among mathematicians.
Analogously, as I emphasized above, most 
physicists consider spacetime theory a fruitful mathe-
matical tool, rather than an exhaustive explanation of 
the very nature of time. Those (like Weyl) who grasped 
the relevance of the subjective experience of time end-
ed up admitting the immeasurableness of the intuition 
and formalization of the time continuum. What I at-
tempted to demonstrate in this text is that Husserl’s 
phenomenology is still in a position to provide a rigorous description of how the spa-
cetime is given to a transcendental subject. More closely, rather than being a mere il-
lusion, the intuitive experience of time continuum is an absolute given without which 
any mathematical formalization, therefore any physical theory, would be impossible. 
Much work is yet to be done in this direction. Nevertheless, Husserl’s thought has still 
much to offer in order to shed light into the enigmatic entrenchment of our transcen-
dental life with any scientific theory.
the natural (countable infinite) or 
real number set; (ii) has the small-
est transfinite cardinality after the 
countable infinite. These two for-
mulations are equivalent if one 
assumes the nine-item list of rules 
called Zermelo-Fraenkel set the-
ory plus the axiom of choice (1904), 
affirming that, given any collec-
tion of non-empty sets, it is pos-
sible to make a selection of 
exactly one object from each set, 
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